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THE USE THAT THE FUTURE MAKES OF THE PAST: JOHN
MARSHALL'S GREATNESS AND ITS LESSONS FOR TODAY'S
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
JACK M. BALIN*
John Marshall's greatness rests on a relatively small number of
Supreme Court opinions, of which the most famous are Marbury v.
Madison, McCullochv. Maryland,2 and Gibbons v. Ogden.' Beyond
these are a number of less famous but also important cases,
including his opinions in the Native American cases," Fletcher v.
Peck,5 and DartmouthCollege v. Woodward.6
What makes Marshall a great Justice? One feature is certainly
his institutional role in making the U.S. Supreme Court much more
important to American politics than it had been previously. That is
a function, however, of the sorts of cases that were brought before
the Court, and of the opinions he chose to write. Marshall was also
important as an early intellectual leader of the Court, as opposed
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School.
My thanks to Bruce Ackerman and Sanford Levinson for their comments on previous drafts.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3. 22 U.S. (9-Wheat.) 1 (1824).
4. Worcesterv. Georgia, 31U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nationv. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
5. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Michael Klarman has argued that Marshall gets more
credit for these opinions than he deserves, and that "the prevalent assumption that they
fundamentally shaped the course of American national development is almost certainly
wrong." Michael Klarman, How GreatWere the Great MarshallCourtDecisions?, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1111 (2001).
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to being merely its Chief Justice. That, too, is a function of the
opinions he wrote.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS COUNT

Thus, Marshall's greatness tends to revolve around his opinions.
What exactly did those opinions do? They often involved the initial
construction of a piece of constitutional text. The initial gloss on a
portion of the Constitution offers a judge the opportunity for the
creation of new doctrinal categories that will prove lasting. That is
clearly the case with Marshall. Many doctrines or catch phrases,
including "political question," "domestic dependent nations," and
the doctrine of implied powers, either begin with or are made
famous by Marshall. It is important to note, however, that almost
any initial gloss on a piece of constitutional text is likely to have a
disproportionate influence on the later development of interpretations of that piece of text. That is because subsequent interpretations normally rely on the initial interpretation. Even if they
disagree with or distinguish it, they must take the initial gloss into
account. Interpretative traditions are path-dependent, and the later
direction of the path often depends heavily on the initial first steps.
In particular, the initial gloss on a piece of constitutional text
can either cause the text to become a wellspring of further
interpretations, or, as in the case of Justice Miller's initial
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' it can essentially make the constitutional text
irrelevant and thus forestall virtually all litigation concerning it. All
other things being equal, the first approach is likely to be the more
influential and honored in the long run. That is because lawyers
will tend to focus on those parts of the Constitution about which
they can litigate. All things being equal, Justices tend to be more
highly regarded if lawyers spend a lot of time thinking and arguing
about their opinions. Thus, the opinions of a Justice who makes a
portion of the Constitution litigable will inevitably draw more
attention than the opinions of a Justice who makes a portion of the
Constitution effectively a dead letter. I suspect that Justice Miller's
7. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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importance stems largely from the fact that he was the first to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, but that he would have been
much more important and much more famous if he had not
squashed the life out of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and,
instead, had created a gloss that future lawyers could fight over.

PICKING THE RIGHT TOPICS
This brings me to a second feature of Marshall's opinions.
Marshall wrote on subjects that were of immense importance
to the America of his day: contractual liberties, the rights of
settlers versus Native Americans, and the powers of the national
government vis-A-vis the states. And, of course, Marbury v.
Madison is a case about the struggle between the two major
political parties of Marshall's day-the Federalists and the
Republicans-as well as a case about the relative powers of the
judiciary vis-h-vis the Congress. All other things being equal, a
Justice who hurls the Court into major political controversies is
more likely to be regarded as controversial, and hence, almost by
definition, more talked about and discussed.
Marshall's choices in this respect were impeccable if his goals
were to have great influence in his own day and lasting influence in
the future. It is important to recognize that in the 1800s the
Supreme Court's docket was not essentially discretionary as it is
today. Hence, Marshall could not pick and choose his topics; rather,
he had to take advantage of whatever opportunities were presented
by the cases that came to the Court. Marshall did not squander his
opportunities. His initial glosses on most of the constitutional texts
he construed were not like Justice Miller's in that they cut off
future development. Marbury v. Madison, which confirmed the
power of judicial review, opened a wide swath of possibilities for
future constitutional development, as did McCulloch and Gibbons.
All of these opinions raised more questions than they answered.
Of course, there is no guarantee that what is a central topic of
concern in 1820 will continue to be an important question two
hundred years later. The question of contractual rights raised in
cases like Fletcher v. Peck, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, and
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Sturges v. Crowninshield, was quite important in Marshall's own
day, but the Contracts Clause has largely receded from importance
in constitutional law due to significant changes in political and
economic aspects of American life. Nevertheless, the more
controversial and central the topics that a Justice takes on, the
more likely it is that he or she will hit upon something that is
lasting. In Marshall's case, he hit the jackpot in Marbury,
McCulloch, and Gibbons. Judicial review, the scope of national
powers, federalism, and Congress's commerce power have turned
out to be perennial topics of concern in American constitutional law.
Obviously Marshall's own initial interpretations had something to
do with this, but one suspects that even if he had not written his
opinions so broadly, these topics would have been rather important
in American politics.
A similar phenomenon applies to Justice Story. His opinion in
Priggv. Pennsylvania9 construed the Fugitive Slave Clause, a dead
letter today. It was his opinions in cases like Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,'0 as well as his commentaries on the Constitution, 1 that
helped to establish his reputation. It is important to note that the
converse phenomenon is not always true. A Justice who writes an
opinion about a topic that was considered relatively unimportant in
his or her own day but later becomes quite significant may get some
boost in reputation, but not as great as when the topic is a
continuing source of concern.
Story's example raises another important factor-longevity.
Longevity bolsters a Justice's reputation for any number of reasons.
The longer one stays on the Court, the more opportunities for
writing on a wide variety of topics, and hence, the greater the
chances for garnering the attention of present and future
generations. In addition, longevity gives a Justice more of a chance
to develop an army of supporters and allies who will praise his or
her name (I will say more about the importance of a coterie of
admirers in a moment). It is hard to say which Justices were most
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). One might add Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213 (1827), which featured Marshall's only dissent in a constitutional case.
9. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536 (1842).
10. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITTON OF THE UNITED STATES (1833).
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hurt by lack of longevity, but a list of likely candidates would
include Abe Fortas, Arthur Goldberg, and Wiley Rutlege, all men of
considerable intellectual capacity whose careers on the bench were
cut short for one reason or another. The Justice who was probably
least hurt by lack of longevity is Benjamin Cardozo, but that is
largely because Cardozo's reputation as a common law jurist was
secured before he was appointed to the Supreme Court of the
United States. 2
BEING ON THE "RIGHT SIDE"
This brings me to a third feature of Marshall's opinions: Marshall
had the great fortune to be on the "right" side of most of the
national disputes that he wrote about, judged from the standpoint
of later generations. Put more bluntly, Marshall was the beneficiary
of an American politics that, especially in the twentieth century,
accepted the centrality ofjudicial review, sought an expanded role
for the national government, and established the importance of
national regulatory decision making over local state control. The
Civil War and the New Deal both promoted federal supremacy over
the states, and the New Deal promoted federal regulatory
supremacy. Although judicial review was attacked during the New
Deal, Marshall's decisions in McCulloch and Gibbons could easily
be understood as exercises of judicial restraint, not judicial
assertion, since they deferred to congressional judgments about the
scope of national power. In any case, with the rights revolution and
the civil rights movement of the second half of the twentieth
century, judicial review became entirely respectable again, and
Marbury became an honored symbol of the role that courts could
play in making America a just society under the rule of law.
All of this is in some sense ironic. Although Marshall did write on
behalf of expanded judicial and federal power, the courts and the
federal government have much greater power and influence than he
would have dreamed of, and he might well have opposed many
features of current doctrine. 13 Perhaps more importantly, federal
12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 128 (1990).

13. See, for example, his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders, which anticipates Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Ogden, 25 U.S. at 332 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
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power and judicial power were, at least in the twentieth century,
often associated with progressive and liberal causes. John Marshall
was not a progressive or a liberal. He was a defender of many of the
values of the Federalist Party years after that party had ceased to
exist. From the standpoint of today's society he would more likely
be a friend of the rich and the powerful than of the poor and the
powerless.
Nevertheless, Marshall is honored today because he guessed
correctly about the direction of the country's growth, and he
guessed correctly not merely because of his wisdom but because he
proved useful to the people who came after him. He had the right
politics in his day for the politics of later generations, and in
particular, for the politics of our own day.
By contrast, consider Roger B. Taney, who is one of the most
famous of Supreme Court Justices, but had the misfortune to guess
wrong on the issue of slavery. Taney was, in his own day, a
supporter of Jacksonianism interested in the plight of the average
(white) man and opposed to the concentration of economic power in
the hands of a favored few. However, he was also a staunch
supporter of slavery, and with it, state's rights. He is best
remembered today for DredScott v. Sandford,14 in which he argued
that blacks could not be citizens because, according to the original
understanding at the time of the Constitution, they were "beings of
an inferior order, ... altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, ... and having.., no rights which the white man was bound
to respect."15 This proved not to be a particularly good strategy for
being well thought of in the future.
Indeed, if Taney is remembered at all today, it is largely because
he brought the Court headlong into the most important political
controversy of the day-chattel slavery and its expansion
throughout the United States. However, he is not well thought
of because he picked the wrong side in that dispute, at least
judged from the standpoint of the present. Moreover, in support
of that side of the controversy, he wrote the most infamous
opinionin the constitutional canon-Dred Scott v. Sandford. Indeed,

14. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

15. Id. at 407.
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6
Dred Scott, like Justice Brown's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,' is
"anticanonical." Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars repeatedly
endeavor to explain why it is wrongly decided.1' Again, this is not
a formula for ensuring greatness in the eyes of later generations.
Because John Marshall was Chief Justice, and because he was
the dominant intellectual figure on his court, he was usually able
to express his views in majority opinions. Nevertheless, dissenting
opinions that are on the right side of the right topics (in the eyes of
future generations) can also help establish a Justice's reputation.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis made their reputations in part
through their dissents. Holmes is famous for his dissents inLochner
v. New York,' 8Abrams v. United States, 9 and Gitlow v. New York.20
Brandeis, who joined Holmes' dissents in Abrams and Gitlow, is
also famous for his dissents in New State Ice Company v.
22
Liebmann2 ' and for his concurrence in Whitney v. California,
which is, in effect, a dissent from the reasoning of the majority.
John Marshall Harlan is perhaps most famous for his dissents in
Plessyv. FergusonandThe CivilRightsCases.23 His grandson, John
Marshall Harlan II, is famous for his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,2 4
which supported contraceptive rights.

WASHING ONE'S SINS AWAY
It should be obvious from Taney's example that being on "the
right side" has everything to do with the judgment of later
generations and with how the future constructs a Justice's legacy.
Without his support of slavery, Taney would probably be
remembered quite differently, perhaps as the keyjudicial proponent
of Jacksonian democracy. That would have made him a champion
16. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons ofConstitutionalLaw, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 963, 1019 (1998).
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
20. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
21. 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
23. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of egalitarian values, rather than a defender of inequality. To a very
large extent, Justices cannot control how future generations will
understand them. Nevertheless, it is helpful if a Justice has a
devoted coterie of admirers who will play up the Justice's good
works and play down those opinions that seem mistaken or
benighted in the light of subsequent history. Put in more
contemporary terms, spin control on behalf of a Justiceparticularly during his or her lifetime but also in the years
immediately after-is particularly important to securing
a
favorable report for posterity. When a Justice has devoted admirers
protecting his or her reputation, the judgments of history may be
far milder. Then, to reverse Mark Antony's famous line, the good
that these Justices do lives after them, while the evil is interred
with their bones. Their judicial sins are washed away.
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. Holmes had the good fortune to be greatly admired in
his own lifetime. He had a devoted circle of adherents-in the legal
academy, the practicing bar, and on the bench-who stressed his
good works and deemphasized his less savory opinions and
decisions.' This helped propel his good reputation forward in later
years. Even though his status has had its ups and downs, he is still
counted by most lawyers and legal scholars as a very great
Justice.26
Today Holmes is revered for his Lochner dissent, and for his
dissents with Justice Louis Brandeis in early First Amendment
cases likeAbrams and Gitlow. But it is important to remember that7
he also upheld Eugene V. Debs' conviction for seditious advocacy.
This is no small matter. Debs was a prominent American
politician-as the candidate of the Socialist Party he received
millions of votes in the 1912 and 1920 presidential elections.
Sending so famous a dissident to jail was certainly a greater blow
25. See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE WORK, AND LEGACY OF
JUSTICE HOLMEs 181-82 (2000); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVERWENDELL HOLMES: LAW
AND THE INNER SELF 355-56 (1993).
26. Hence the title of Yosal Rogat's famous critical essay on Holmes. Yosal Rogat, Mr.
Justice Holmes, A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1962). Alschuler notes, with
evident dismay, that the 1990s produced "an extraordinary wealth of ...writing about
Holmes, nearly all of it laudatory." ALSCHULER, supra note 25, at 10.
27. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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to civil liberties and freedom of speech than the conviction of the
little known defendants inAbrams or Gitlow.
If Holmes didn't care for substantive due process in Lochner, he
liked it no better in Buck v. Bell,28 in which he upheld an

involuntary sterilization with the callous remark that "[tihree
generations of imbeciles are enough."29 He also dissented in Meyer
v. Nebraska,3" in which the State of Nebraska, in a fit of war
hysteria, tried to prevent the teaching of German in public
schools-a plan the Court struck down under a theory of
substantive due process. Meyer, of course, became a key precedent
in the line of cases leading up to Skinner v. Oklahoma 1 and
Griswold v. Connecticut.12 Finally, Holmes, the great civil

libertarian, wrote the opinion in Giles v. Harris," in which he
acquiesced to the wholesale disenfranchisement of blacks in
Alabama, blandly remarking that there was nothing the Court
could do to stop the most blatant violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 3 ' Holmes argued for judicial restraint in all threecases. But doing nothing seems considerably less admirable in
Meyer and Giles than it does in Lochner.
Nevertheless, even though there is much that is distasteful in
Holmes's judicial record, he is remembered today as the great
advocate of judicial restraint in Lochner and the great protecter of
free speech inAbrams and Gitlow. His sins in cases like Debs,Buck,
Meyer, and Gileshave been washed away. Another important factor
that may have helped Holmes is his style, which is pithy, quotable,
and fun to read.35
The first Justice Harlan is another example of a Justice whose
sins have been washed away by later generations. Harlan is best
known today for his denunciation of Jim Crow in his dissent in
28. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
29. Id. at 207.
30. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
31. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
34. Id. at 486-88.
35. Similarly, Judge Richard Posner concludes that one of the factors that helped
Benjamin Cardozo attain his exalted status is his rhetorical style. POSNER, supra note 12,
at 126-27.
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Plessy. Less well knownis that this same dissent reflects anti-Asian
sentiments. Harlan argues that it is unfair that blacks should be
denied the right to sit with whites in railway carriages when this
privilege is enjoyed by the Chinese, "a race so different from our
own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens
of the United States." 6 He also joined Chief Justice Fuller's dissent
in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 7 which argued that Chinese
born in the United States should not become birthright citizens
because they were so alien a race that they could not be assimilated
into American culture."8 Nevertheless, because of his Plessy dissent,
with its many famous phrases, and his dissent in The Civil Rights
Cases,Harlan is seen to have been on the right side of the struggle
for racial equality in the 1880s and 1890s. For this reason, he is
honored today.
When we look more closely at John Marshall, we can see that he
too has been the beneficiary ofritual cleansing by later generations.
Like Holmes, he was a great stylist, and like Holmes, Marshall was
greatly respected in his lifetime. He was beloved by his fellow
judges, and particularly by Justice Story, who did much to elevate
his reputation.39 Finally, like Holmes, his more honored opinions
have obscured other features of his career. After all, Marshall's
record in the Native American cases-particularly Graham'sLessee
v. M'Intosh-washardly praiseworthy. And his dissent in Ogden v.
Saunders anticipates Justice Peckham's opinion in Lochner.
Because of his opinions in Marbury, McCulloch, and Gibbons,
however, these sins have all been washed away. Furthermore, as I
have noted, during the New Deal, Marshall became a convenient
symbol of constitutional nationalism.
36. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan also
joined the Court's opinion in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), which, a decade prior to
Plessy, upheld a conviction for miscegenation on the grounds that separation of the races
treated blacks and whites equally.
37. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
38. Id. at 725-32 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). He alsojoined in the Chinese Exclusion Cases,
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) and Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581 (1889). See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The PlessyMyth: Justice Harlanand the
Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996) (criticizing Harlan's attitudes toward the civil

rights of Asians).
39. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 11, at iii-iv, reprinted with introductionby Ronald D.
Rotunda and John E. Nowak (1987) (a book dedicated to John Marshall).
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Marshall and Holmes have something else in common. Both are
protean. They can be many different things to many different
people.4" Of course this simply restates in another way the point I
have been making: Justices' reputations do not belong to them.
They belong, instead, to the people who make use of those
reputations. Reputations are made and shaped based in part on the
constitutional controversies of later periods. People look to past
Justices as potential heros and villians. The more protean a Justice
is, the more that people of differing views can hold the Justice up
as an exemplar of their favored approach to constitutional
interpretation. Both Holmes and Marshall fill this role admirably,
and that is one reason why their reputations have endured.
SHOULD JuSTIcES TRY TO BE GREAT?
To sum up, Marshall's greatness seems to stem from four factors.
First, he was able to provide the initial gloss on key constitutional
texts and initiated many new constitutional doctrines. Second, the
glosses he created were productive and fertile, creating abundant
opportunities for future discussion and contestation. Third, he
picked topics that were at the forefront of political concern in his
era. And fourth, he was on the "right side" of most of these
controversies, as judged by the political values of later generations,
and, in particular, of our own day. To the extent that he was on the
wrong side of other disputes, these have been conveniently
forgotten. His judicial sins have, for the most part, been washed
away.
This brings me to my central point. None of these factors seems
to have very much to do with the sorts of criteria that law
professors (and many politicians) offer as desiderata in current
members of the federal judiciary. Today, one often hears calls for
judges who interpret law, but do not make it; for judges who eschew
judicial activism; for judges who respect the original intentions of
the Framers and the values of the founding generation; for judges
who are strict constructionists; for judges who are judicial
40. Richard Posner makes a similar point in his study of Cardozo. POSNER, supra note
12, at 60-61, 143.
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minimalists; for judges who write principled decisions; for judges
who respect precedent; for judges who exercise prudence and the
passive virtues; and for judges who defer to majorities and stay out
of political controversies. All ofthese are probably valuable features
of judicial practice. My point, however, is that none of them mesh
with the reasons why we regard Justices of the Supreme Court as
having been great or honorable in the long run.
Let us return to Roger Taney for a moment. Taney's argument in
Dred Scott that blacks could not be citizens is a veritable paean to
original intention and strict construction. But that cuts no ice
today, because it was for a horrible cause. Felix Frankfurter was an
advocate of judicial restraint like few have seen. But his star has
been in eclipse because he took the wrong position on many of the
key civil rights issues of his day. To be sure, Frankfurter was a hero
to many scholars who supported judicial restraint during the 1950s,
but his support of the New Deal and Brown v. Board ofEducation4 '
are probably the strongest reasons for his continued status as a
great Justice today.
Indeed, Frankfurter's elevated status may stem, in part, from the
abundant good work that he did before he became a Justice, as a
dogged defender of civil rights and civil liberties. In that case he
would be more like Thurgood Marshall, who is the greatest
American lawyer of the twentieth century. Marshall's Supreme
Court career was distinguished enough, but even if he had never
been a Supreme Court Justice, he would still be honored today for
his work in fighting racial apartheid in the United States.
Marshall's pre-Court work graces and elevates his work as a
Justice, and the same may also be true of Frankfurter. In any case,
Frankfurter's star may yet again shine more brightly, but if it does,
it will be because many liberal constitutional scholars see analogies
between the current Supreme Court and the conservative Court of
the 1920s and 1930s. A little judicial restraint looks awfully good to
them right about now.
With Frankfurter, compare William Brennan. Brennan violated
almost every principle of sound judicial decision making. He didn't
care much for original intention, he was alternatively activist and
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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restrained when it suited him, he never saw a statute he didn't like
to rewrite, and the only precedents he truly respected were those he
agreed with. Yet, there is no doubt in my mind that William
Brennan is one of the greatest Justices of the twentieth century,
and possibly of all time. That is because he was on the right side of
most of the political battles of his era. He fought for civil rights and
racial equality during an era when many more moderate and hence
"sensible" people thought they could be compromised or done
without. My judgment about Brennan's greatness is clearly colored
by my own politics, but that is precisely my point. It is politics, and
especially the politics of later generations, that tells us whether a
Justice did his or her job superbly, merely adequately, or terribly,
and whether the Justice will be remembered for good, remembered
for bad, or simply forgotten as an irrelevancy or mediocrity.
It is no accident, I think, that there is currently a very wellfunded lecture series named after William Brennan,42 but not a
comparable series named after Felix Frankfurter. In time there
may be one, but the reason will not have to do with whether one or
the other of them construed statutes better. It will be because of the
political significance of Frankfurter's work to a future generation.
I have been arguing that Marshall's greatness-and indeed the
greatness of all Supreme Court Justices-is a function of political
usefulness to later generations, not whether they conformed to
currently fashionable theories of good legal craft and judicial
prudence. Nobody, I argue, gets put in the Hall of Judicial Fame
because "he was always very deferential to majorities," or "she
always wrote the narrowest opinion possible," or even, "he always
looked to the intentions of the founding generation." Rather, if an
originalist or textualist is regarded as a great Justice it will be
because of the political valence of originalism or textualism in his
or her own time. Hugo Black is a case in point. It is Black's support
for civil liberties during the cold war, and not his theories about the
centrality of the constitutional text, that make him a great Justice.
It is Black's opinion in Korematsu v. United States,43 and not his
42. The lecture series is sponsored by the Brennan Center for Justice at the NYU School
of Law. See http://www.brennancenter.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2002).
43. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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lack of judicial craft, that has done the most to diminish his
reputation.
These conclusions should not be surprising. The Supreme Court
is a political institution that must do its work through the forms
and practices of legal decision making. In the long run, those forms
and practices, which necessarily and appropriately constrain
Justices in their own day, fall away from public concern. What is
left standing is the quality of the political principles these Justices
defended and the quality of the politics they created and preserved.
What does this mean for the current Supreme Court? Simply
this: Judging by the criteria I have outlined in this essay, the
current Chief Justice, William H. Rehnquist, has most of the indicia
for future greatness. He has thrust himself into most of the
important constitutional controversies of his generation. He has
written opinions that produced considerable subsequent discussion
and litigation. And he has longevity: Rehnquist languished as a
dissenter on the Burger Court for many years, only to see many of
his dissenting positions eventually taken up by a majority of the
Court.
Whether William Rehnquist will eventually be regarded as a
great Justice (and Chief Justice) will, in the long run, rest on
whether he has been on the right side of the most important
questions he fought over as judged by future generations. Rehnquist
opposed the creation of sex-equality doctrine in the 1970s and the
protection of gay rights in the 1980s and 1990s; he opposed
affirmative action and the expansion of civil rights litigation. He
sought to contract the rights of the accused and the rights of habeas
petitioners. He sought to increase state sovereignty at the expense
of federal regulatory power. And, of course, he joined in that great
exercise of judicial restraint, Bush v. Gore.44 If, in the long run,
many or most of these political positions become admired,
Rehnquist will be regarded as a great Justice, perhaps even one of
the greatest. On the other hand, if the positions that he staked out
and defended eventually are regarded as reactionary or unjust from
the standpoint of the future, Rehnquist will be regarded like Justice
Peckham, who wrote Lochner v. New York, or Justice Brown, who
44. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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wrote Plessy v. Ferguson, or perhaps like Chief Justice Taney,
whose importance cannot be denied but who had the misfortune to
support slavery and was the author of Dred Scott v. Sanford.
Many of the same points apply to Rehnquist's conservative ally
on the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia. Scalia's lively style and his
very opinionated opinions suggest that he, too, is a potential
candidate for greatness. Like Rehnquist, he has a coterie of devoted
conservative admirers who can praise his achievements and can
downplay his failings. If the politics of the future agree with a
sizeable segment of Scalia's views, his judicial sins will be washed
away and he will take his place in the pantheon of Supreme Court
greatness. Only time will tell whose politics eventually triumph.
If, as I have argued, greatness is a matter of the politics that a
Justice espouses, rather than fidelity to original intention, strict
construction, judicial restraint, or careful parsing of previous
precedents, does this suggest that Justices should cast aside all
concerns about judicial craft and simply try to be great? This is, I
am afraid, a fool's errand. No one can be sure exactly what the
politics of the future will look like, so it is hardly a wise idea to try
to curry favor with it. That is an important reason why most
politicians and lawyers look to factors that are orthogonal to
greatness injudging the Justices oftheir own era. Not every Justice
will be considered great by future generations, and indeed, we can
be quite sure that most will not. Hence, it is better for a Justice to
try to do his or her job scrupulously and professionally. Craft and
judiciousness matters greatly in the present, because the future
belongs to the future.
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL PROPHECY

Nevertheless, I do have one piece of advice for members of the
judiciary. It is not, I am sorry to say, a recipe for greatness. It is
rather a suggestion about how one might be deserving of the esteem
of the future, even if that esteem is not ultimately given. It is
simply this: Don't be afraid to have a vision of the country and what
it means. Your vision may not match the views of future
generations, it is true, but if you do not have a vision of what
America is and what its future and its destiny should be, there is
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little chance that the future will think your work truly great. If you
do not see great things, great things will not be seen in you. Many
Justices have had views about the judicial role. Many have had
strongly held views about the political issues of their own day. But
to. be great, one must be able to see beyond the struggles of the
present and imagine the country, its meaning, and its future. One
must take a stand about what America is and is to become.
I often wonder about Roger Taney from this perspective. He
probably had a Jacksonian vision of an America populated by free,
equal white men, supported by their own industry and labor, with
special privileges for none. It is also clear from DredScott that he
believed that America could not and should not ever become a
colonial power, and that as new territories were acquired by the
United States they should eventually become parts of the Union."
Yet, I wonder whether he really had a picture of the future,
especially given his views on slavery. Did he think that slavery
would last forever? 6 Did he ever imagine that it would someday
clash with his anticolonial and Jacksonian sympathies? When he
quoted the racist opinions of the founding generation with approval
in Dred Scott, did he think that he was fulfilling a great vision of
the country's destiny? Or was he merely cleverly trying to solve a
political controversy of his own day? It is easy to understand what
Taney thought America was. It is harder to know what Taney
thought America would become.
In this respect, I think, Marshall is genuinely different. Of all of
the memorable passages in John Marshall's work, there is one that
I return to again and again when I teach my students. It occurs in
his 1819 masterpiece, McCullochv. Maryland.In the midst of many
extremely clever-and occasionally specious-arguments about how
the text of the Constitution supports his expansive view of federal
power, Marshall suddenly pauses and offers a very different kind
of argument for why the young national government must be given

45. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 446 (1857).
46. Probably not. Taney seems to have believed that gradual emancipation was the best
solution for blacks and that liberating them all at once would harm their interests. WALKER
LEWIS, WITHOUTFEARORFAVOR: ABIOGRAPHYOF CHIEFJUSTICEROGERBROOxE TANEY 36062 (1965).
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the widest authority. It is nothing less than an argument about the
meaning of America and the future of the country:
Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf of
Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be
collected and expended, armies are to be marched and
supported. The exigencies of the nation may require, that the
treasure raised in the north should be transported to the south,
that raised in the east, conveyed to the west, or that this order
should be reversed. Is that construction of the constitution to be
preferred, which would render these operations difficult,
hazardous and expensive? Can we adopt that construction
(unless the words imperiously require it), which would impute
to the framers of that instrument, when granting these powers
for the public good, the intention of impeding their exercise, by
withholding a choice of means?"
It is worth noting that in 1819 the boundaries of the United
States did not in fact extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or from
the St. Croix to the Gulf of Mexico. But in this passage Marshall
engages in prophecy. Someday, he suggests, this is what the
country will be: great and mighty, spanning an entire continent.
Such a country needs a flexible Constitution that will allow it to
fight its wars, to expand its reach, and to bring this enormous mass
of land under its sway. In this passage, perhaps more than any
other, John Marshall gives us a story about what America is and
would become. Not everyone, I suspect, agrees with all of the
implications of this story. For one thing, it involved the slaughter
and displacement of many innocent Native Americans and the
bullying of Spanish-speaking inhabitants of the continent.
Nevertheless, fate has smiled on Marshall's vision of America as a
great continental power. Future generations have accepted his
vision of the Constitution as a flexible instrument of democracy that
has-in the limited ways that constitutions can-helped America
to achieve its present degree of prominence and success.

47. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819). Lewis H. LaRue
emphasizes the importance of this passage in his beautifully written book on narrative in
constitutional law. He calls this John Marshall's "[S]tory of... [G]rowth." LEWIS H. LARUE,
CONSTITTrIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY 90 (1995).
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Marshall, then, is great because he was a prophet of American
nationalism. If the history of America had turned out differently, if
the nation had fractured as a result of the Civil War, or if America
had never risen to the status of a great power-his star might not
shine so brightly today. Of course, that is always the case with
prophets. Most prophets are false prophets. Their prophecies are
discarded and soon forgotten. Even true prophets do not always
understand the full import of what they are saying. That is largely
because what they say is not true at the time, but is rather made
true by later events. Prophets are the servants of the future, and
prophecy is one of the uses that the future makes of the past.

